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Appellants by petition in this former probate proceeding, which was closed in 1945, are seeking to proceed separately against administrators who were then
expressly discharged by decree of the Court, as if they
were still acting, and then by such petition, to set aside
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that same decree both as to the distribution of the estate
then made therein and also as to the then express discharge of these two administrators.
STATEMENT
Here the effort of the appellant brief is to reverse
the trial Court's order dismissing their said petition.
The argument ignores the most fundamental grounds of
support for this order, and also disregards certain statutes and facts upon which the order below was principally based.
The statement of facts is only slightly inaccurate
in what is stated, but it conveys an incomplete understanding by misconstruing portions of the record taken
out of context, and by omitting important portions thereof.
We can call attention to these matters by followmg
appellants' points in the same numbered order, and then
bringing in the relevant omitted and additional matters
where these seem to apply.
We will, therefore, answer their five points in the
order as argued by appellants. We will state our position very briefly under each number and then present
our contentions under their point numbers in the same
order. Under "Point 5" we will discuss the five grounds
of our motion to dismiss, which was sustained by the trial
Court. If any of these grounds were properly sustained,
the order of dismissal of appellants' petition wa~, of
course, proper. Appellants have attacked none of these,
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3
except by indirect reference to the subject matter of two
of them.
\Ve deny that appellants would be entitled to a reversal even if they were correct in any, or in all, of their
first four points, but shall nevertheless show wherein
they are wrong on these.
AS TO POINTS
To indicate the conflicts between us here, we will
very briefly state our position on each of appellants' five
points, as follows:
Claims of appellants have been settled according to the stipulation, and on their own plan of carrying it out.
1.

2. Decree of distribution was carried out, as it
is therein recited, and before respondent was discharged.
3. Settlement did not fail but was carried out as
agreed and directed to be done by appellants.
4. Appellants are not entitled, and could receive
no benefit from a distribution according to their claim
of succession, and, if they were, respondent can do
nothing about it.
5. The order dismissing appellants' petition was
legal and proper and each of the grounds of respondent's
motion sustained by the Court were well taken.
POINT I
This point goes to the question as to whether the
decree of distribution was in accordance with a prior
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stipulated settlen1ent of the appellants' claims. \Ye disagree, as to whether it was, and, also, as to whether it
needed to be.
At the beginning of appellants' discussion of this
(p. 12) they question the authority of Mr. Cotro-)Ianes
(who, for the sake of brevity, will be referred to hereinafter as Mr. "C-M") to make the settlement. It is stated
(p. 13):
"There is serious doubt in our minds as to
whether Mr. Cotro-Manes, in the first place could
enter into such a stipulation where no notice was
given to the heirs * * * concerning the appointment of an attorney to represent them."
Since similar intimations occur throughout their
brief, and since Mr. C-M's actions on behalf of appellants were the basis for the proceedings taken and orders
entered by the Oourt as to appellants, we will attempt
to clear this matter up at the outset.
His appointment to act for these heirs, who are now
the appellants here, was pursuant to our State Statute,
as follows:
Attorney for minors and nonrfsidenfs.
At or before the hearing of petitions "" "" "" for letters
testamentary or of administration, for "" "" • settlements,
partitions and distributions of estates, • • • and all other
proceedings where notice is required or prescribed, • • •
the court may, in its discretion, appoint some competent
attorney at law to represent in all such proceeding~ all
persons interested who are minors and have no gen75-14-25.
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5
eral guardian in the county, or who are nonresidents
of the state, and all those interested who, though they are
neither such n1inors nor nonresidents, are unrepresented.
The order must specify the names of the parties so far
as known for whom the attorney is appointed, and he
is thereby authorized to represent such parties in all such
proceedings and su,bsequent to this appointment. The
attorney 1nay receive a fee, to be fixed by the court, for
his services, which must be paid in the case of estates of
decedents out of the funds of the estate as necessa.ry
expenses of administration, and upon distribution may
be eharged to the party represented by the attorney,
* * *
There is nothing here, or anywhere else that we can
find, requiring notice of his appointment. None is "required or prescribed." And the very purpose of the
statute appears to refute any such contention.
It is plainly intended to give the Court "discretion"
to take care of situations where "minors" without guardians and "non-residents of the state," could not be expected to readily receive notice or to consult or act for
their protection, at least could not do so without intolerable or interminable delays.

And since it was common knowledge at the time
that Greece was overrun by Communists and was itself
in a state of Communist revolution and war, this was
clearly a proper place for the Court to exercise this discretion.
If notice to and approval by the persons to be represented were a necessity. this statute would never have
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been needed, and it can serve no useful purpose. By
this statute he was thereafter authorized in "all * * *
proceedings where notice is required or prescribed."
In any event the intent and meaning of this statute,
75-14-25, is clear as to Mr. C-M's authority here, and to
the effect that:
(1) He was thereby, and by his appointment thereunder, "authorized to represent such parties in all suclz
proceedings subsequent to this appointment," and all the
proceedings involved were subsequent, and
(2) That "such parties" were the same as the appellants who are now here complaining, and the father
and predecessor in interest of two minor appellants, and
(3) That the "such proceedings" to which he was
expressly so appointed to represent them were the
"settlements, partitions and distributions of estate." And
these are exactly the things he did represent them in.
This statute, therefore, settles the question of his authority here. What he did, was then in legal effect, done
by appellants themselves.
In State v. Dist. Court, 85 P. 1022, the Montana Supreme Court held that the appointment by the Probate
Court, in this situation, of a guardian ad litem under
statutes similar to ours, as to such guardians, was void
since their probate statute, which appears to be in the
exact language of our 75-14-25, covers and .. is exclusive" as to the like appointment of legal representatives
in probate proceedings, and points out that California
and some other Courts have also so held.
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Speaking of the purpose of this statute, one cited
California Court said:
"Now, the attorney for minors in probate
proceedings is to represent the minor, and so far
as he is concerned, to conduct and control the proceedings."
Since appellants have made no effort to support
either their intimations as to lack of authority of Mr.
C-~1 or the constitutionality of the statute or of his appointment thereunder, we do not feel called upon to further refute such intimations. However, in the following
cases the Courts have made pertinent observations on the
question of such constitutionality of appointment:

In Re Esta.te of Lux (Cal.) 66 P. 30;
Learch v. Pierce (Cal.), 29 P. 239;
In Re Estate of Roarke (Ariz.), 68 P. 527.
In each of the last two cases the Supreme Courts
of these states say, as to the order of appointment: "The
order may be made ex pa.rte and no notice of the entry
thereof is required."
And further, this appointment in the exercise of
discretion by Judge Ellett (R. 240) and the right of
Mr. C-ni thereunder to represent these heirs, was thereafter recognized by three other Judges of the lower
Court; Judges Van Oott, Crockett and Bronson.
And this appointment and this settlement were not
instigated or promoted (R. 2-±3-253) by the administrators against whom appellants are complaining. The administrators' attorney in fact made to the Court a sug-
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gestion that such an appointment may not be nece~sary
(R. 24) and he raised the only questions that were raised
on the settlement and then indicated to the Court the
possibility that these heirs 1night finally realize an
amount of some $1,100.00 more than appellants were
then seeking to agree to and get (R. 249-250). It now
appears that his estimate was perhaps not as good as
that made by the appellants' representative.
And time then seemed important too, because :Jir.
C-M satisfied the Court that delivery of at least some
of this money could be made immediately (R. 257) and
that it was urgently needed by these foreign heirs, as
well as by the local heir, who was also a party to this
settlement.
The "settlements, partitions and distributions" now
complained of were promoted (R. 249) and procured (R.
246-253) by and for the appellants themselves. This respondent, as administrator, had no interest whatsoever
in this.
Meaning and Effect of Stipulation:

A better understanding of the portion of the stipulation and order in question here will be obtained if some
background is considered.
Just before the Court appraisal had been filed 1\fay
13, 1944 (R. 38) fixing the gross value of the estate at
$76,209.16, Virginia Latsis, acting personally by her own
attorney (R. 45), filed l\Iay 12, 19-t--t a petition (R. -+~)
claiming that an item of $12,000.00 which got into the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bank account of the decedent, and $5,990.23 (R. 43) of
which had been invested by decedent in a lower State
Street property, belonged to her and not to the estate.
It recited that she had sold Davis County property derived from her mother's estate for this $12,000.00. This
claim wa8 indisputable and was found by the trial Court
to be true (R. 67), but Judge Crockett at that time apparently upon a "presumption of gift" theory decided
against her (R. 67), and after findings and judgment,
but before appeal could be taken, a stipulation was entered into between the litigants and was consented to by
the administrators (R. 89) and granted by the Court,
setting aside this decision. This litigation had been entirely between the heirs represented by Mr. C-M on one
side, and the widow represented by her attorney, Mr.
Alke E. Diamant, on the other. The administrators, as
such, had no interest in it.
The order on this stipulation follows after the signatures to the stipulation (R. 90). It reversed the previous decision as to the $12,000.00 as between the litigating parties, but reserved the question as to how it
should be considered by the State Tax Commission for
tax purposes. The Judge also added, after Iiis signature, the following statement which he initialed:
"Subject to approval by the probate division
of this Court as to the compromise above referred
to."
The "compromise above referred to" (R. 90) by the
Judge is the stipulation of settlement now in controver~y. This stipulation is dated (R. 86) Dec. 12, 1944,
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but was not filed until Feb. 13, 1945 (R. 88), just two
days before the reversing of the $12,000.00 iten1, which
was signed and filed Feb. 15 (R. 90). So these 1natters
were handled together. The order approving this $10,000.00 settlement agreement was then signed; it was
filed Feb. 27, 1945 (R. 97), after a hearing.
The stipulation and the hearing thereon were directed principally to the establishment by the appellants,
through their representative, that the settlement of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) was a fair settlement
as between them and the widow of the decedent.
The appellants now place reliance (p. 13) upon a
paragraph in the stipulation (R. 87) that the settlement
"shall become binding and conclusive upon" the individual heirs executing certain receipts or documents
mentioned, and accepting their portion of the settlement
fund. They contend this meant it could never become
binding except upon these being first obtained.
We are entirely unable to see how this statement
at that time has any effect here now. Whether it is considered as a legal conclusion, or a correct recital of something they agreed would be the effect of such acts by the
heirs, it did not limit the settlement in the first place,
nor the further proceedings agreed to and taken. Certainly the parties making the settlement could, if they
had wanted to, change their ideas as to how or when it
should be closed.
It was correct to say that the settlement would have
become binding if the heirs so executed the documents
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and accepted the money. This would be true whether
such statement had been inserted in this stipulation or
not, or whether there had been any stipulation at all.
But, it doesn't follow that there was any agreement
that the stipulation and settlement, as approved by the
Court, would not be binding as an agreement until they
personally so signed. There was no such statement, although it would have been easy to make such, if so intended. In fact, all the actions of all the parties to this
stipulation, and of all the Judges who considered and
acted upon this matter indicate an exactly contrary intention.
This agreement by all of the parties said (R. 86-7),
"that it will be for the best interest of said estate, and
particularly of the said four heirs, that a settlement be
made at this time."
If it had been the intention to have their approval
before the settlement was made, there would have been
no sense in the importance given to making the money
available then, and there would have been no sense in
proceeding to get the order approving the settlement at
that time. Courts do not ordinarily approve and direct
performance of agreements not yet fully agreed to by
the parties, and which never may be.

It must be kept constantly in mind too that this "settlement," in so far as agreed to by Mr. C-M, was made
by these appellants, just as if they had all been present
and signed the agreement themselves. And so also were
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all the acts thereafter taken by their representative
pursuant thereto, their acts.
This stipulation also said (R. 87) :
"It has been agreed that the said four heirs,"
naming them, "will accept in full settlement of all
of their claims, interest and demands, which they
have, or might have had, as heirs at law of the
said decedent, the sum of $10,000.00 to be paid
as hereinafter agreed and provided.

*

* *

"That the Court, upon hearing hereon, shall
determine and fix the attorney's fees and charges
of N. J. Cotro-Manes, as attorney representing
the said four heirs by appointment of the above
entitled Court, and shall direct the manner of
disbursement of the said fund."
So that the settlement was already agreed to, and
the manner of disbursement, which is the thing appellants are talking about, was not settled, but was to he directed later, as it was.
The Order of Feb. 27, 1945:
Appellants (p. 13), after referring to this provision
of the stipulation, say that the order "in like language"
stated the same conditions. This is inaccurate. 'rhe
order (R. 97) on this matter did not mention all the net:-;
mentioned in the stipulation, but only one, it says :-;imply
this:
"It is further ORDERED that the said agrPPment and distribution shall become binding and
conclusive as to each of the said four heirs upon
the acceptance by hhn, or by his heirs at law, of
said payments."
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So that all 1nention of signing of docu1nents, including
receipts and assignments as referred to by the stipulation, are not in this order, at all.
And here again, while it is a true state1nent of law
to say that accepting the benefits of a settlement would
bind the parties to it, again there is no order to the effect
that the n1aking of the settlement depended upon, or was
to await, such personal receipt. A contrary intent clearly
appears in the order itself.
This statement in the order, upon consideration, will
be seen to have had one or two possible purposes. It
could have meant that "acceptance" by their representative would have this effect. One of the four heirs was a
minor who could properly accept only through his representative.
Otherwise, the purpose intended by this was to give
some protection to the representative appointed by the
Court for these foreign heirs. It was beginning to be
common knowledge, as it definitely has since, that during the war organized efforts were commenced to acquire
the interests, or the right to represent the interests, of
foreign heirs residing in enemy nations or in nations
in enemy hands, and who were deprived of, or delayed
in getting, their inheritances. The receipt by these heirs
as referred to in the order, or the signing of documents
as referred to in the stipulation, might protect the representative of these heirs from thereafter claiming that
their representative had made an unauthorized or an
intentionally unfair settlement; or from denying receipt
of the money.
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This purpose is consistent also with the paragraph
of the order quoted by appellants (p. 14) "that the said
heirs shall furnish * * * receipts of said payn1ents,'' and
that "their attorney shall procure" such receipts.
Some more important provisions of this order on
this matter are not referred to or quoted by appellants.
The order says, "all the parties having joined in said
petition and being represented, no notice was required"
(R. 95), then refers to Mr. C-M as "representing the
heirs other than Virginia Latsis." This is consistent
with our position that these heirs were actually there
In Court, at least legally.
Then, after reciting that the settlement is a fair
one and in the best interests of these heirs, and after
fixing the fees of their representative, and in directing
the distribution, the Court says (R. 96) :
"It further appears that in addition to the
services already rendered by the said attorney to
the said heirs, additional services will be required
in arranging and insuring the receipt by the said
heirs of the amount to which each is entitled
under the said settlemnt, to-wit, the amount of
$2,000.00, after the deduction of said attorney's
fees."
Then the Court makes an unconditional order of
distribution of this to "each" of these heirs and it is then
ordered (R. 96) that such payments to the three lll•ir~,
i.e., William and Nick, the brothers, and John, the
nephew, naming them,
"may be made***through the Hellenic Bank
Trust Company of New York Cit)', or through
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the American Express C01npany, 'whichever
source is selected by the above mentioned attorney for the heirs, and that the issuance and delivery of checks to such source SHALL R,ELIEVE
THE AD~IINISTRATORS HEREIN FROM
FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY THEREFOR."
(Emphasis ours.)
This was pursuant to the agreement (R. 87): ''that
the Court***shall direct the ma.nner of disbursement
of the said fund."
Thus, the Court did not, as contended by appellants,
require these administrators to make delivery to these
heirs, or to procure any documents from them. This
mention of "acceptance" in the order had no connection
with the administrators. This matter was left up to
their representative, and he was paid for doing it. We
don't see ho-w there can be any dispute about this. The
final decree makes this conclusive.
The appellants then proceed to argue (p. 14) that
the Court was without jurisdiction to modify this order
of Feb. 27, 1945, by the final order of distribution and
discharge of Oct. 9, 1945. The answer is, the Court
did have jurisdiction to modify it, and also that the
Court didn't modify this or any order.
We agree that the Whitney case cited (p. 16) held
that probate proceedings, as here, are proceedings in rem
and would not be void for want of notice. We have a
statute also to that effect.
The argument that this case should be overruled
and all the argument with relation to notice is beside
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the point here. There is no allegation that the regular
statutory notices were not given throughout. It is contended (p. 17) such final notice was ihsufficient because
it didn't tell the heirs "of the contents of the petition"
for distribution. If this were necessary every decree
of distribution, we think, entered at least for the last
40 years in the District Court here is invalid. The
notice sent to these heirs describes the petition as one
(R. 105) asking for "the settlement of the final account
of said administrators and for the distribution of the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled and discharge." That is what it was. It has not been the
practice to do more than this and it is not required.
Furthermore, this order and this decree plainly
could not be affected by this claim by reason of statutes
which we can better discuss later under Point 5, in discussing the grounds of our motion, and appellants were
represented.
Appellants repeatedly say that the order of Feb.
27, 1945 "was conditional." They must mean that the
delivery of the money to the heirs meant an actual
delivery to and receipt by these personally, and that this
was a condition precedent to the agreement taking effect.
It must seem apparent from the record (R. 1:27 & :2-t-t)
that this could never be done without an agreement first
taking effect so as to get the money for delivery. And
also, that a contrary interpretation was plainly given
by all the parties who participated in procuring, in
making, or in carrying out this order, or who had anything to do with it.
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This ·was con1pleted by the heirs acting through
their representative duly and legally appointed. He also
carried it out as ordered, as far as this was possible,
prior to the tilne the appellants filed their petition here,
and there is no indication that he will not complete the
job. The n1oney is on savings deposit (R. 121) subject
to his order.
\Ve can see no application of the statute or the
cases cited in the brief (p. 15-18) to this point of theirs,
or to our motion to dismiss and the order of the Court
appealed from. We will, however, notice some of these
later.

POINT II
This numbered point by appellants (p. 26) is that
the decree of Oct. 9, 1945 has not been carried out
according to its terms. On this, the record shows that
the decree of distribution has been fully carried out.
Actually this point of theirs is based on the assumption, (1) that Mr. C-M acted without authority in making
the agreement of settlement; and (2) that it was never
completed because the delivery of the money by the
administrators and the receipt of it by these heirs was
a condition precedent to the making or completing the
contract; and now (3) that this condition precedent was
"incorporated" (p. 19) into the final decree of Oct.
9, 1945.
We have considered the first two, and will now
answer the third of these assumptions. This contention
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not only rests upon the two incorrect assumptions discussed, but upon the far-fetched and erroneous assumption that any such condition precedent, if it had ever
existed, was "incorporated by reference" into this final
decree, or, especially, that there is such a condition in
this decree.
Notice in their very first quotation therefrom (p.
19) that the Court said the "settlement" agreement
uwas made and approved." Not that an agreement was
to be made if and when the heirs personally approved
and accepted the money.
In arguing this point appellants can make no claim
that the final decree mentioned any of the references
to documents in the stipulation of settlement. They do
contend it adopted the Feb. 27 order, but this doesn't
have any statement that it shall or shall not become
binding upon the heirs signing any documents. They
claim that what they term "conditions" in the Feb. '27
order as to acceptance of the money were adopted and
that this made the final decree conditional, and also
charged the administrators with procuring personal
acceptance of it by the heirs.
On this it is argued that the final decree, b~r adopting from the Feb. 27 order an inference which they
claim was there, that this agreement could not become
such until there was a personal acceptance of the payments by the heirs, then itself said that the ,agreement
had not been completed and would not be completed until
payments thereunder were personally accepted. Thus
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it is argued that, (1) this final decree says and means
that the contract has not been completed, and (2) that
this final decree adopted this meaning and so held, and
(3) that, therefore, the ad1ninistrators violated the
decree by not holding up all distribution as if no agreement had been attempted. All these are untenable.
If we have refuted the first, the others need not
be considered. However, we deny that this language
was ever intended to be or was adopted in any way or
manner into this final decree, or that any such limitation or condition, as is contended for, was ever mentioned, or adopted. Every provision of it, as well as
its entry at all at that time, refute this.
All that appellants say, by way of adoption by
reference, is stated (p. 19) to the effect that this decree
recited in substance that the files and records showed
that by order dated Feb. 27, 1945 by Judge Van Cott,
a settlement with these heirs was made and approved
and then after stating the amount (R. 20) the decree
mentioned the fees of Mr. C-M and referred to him as
"appointed by the Court to represent said heirs, ***he
to render the additional services required in arranging
and ins11ring the receipt by said heirs of the amount
which each is to receive under the seftlement." And
this settlement is referred to not as one to be made,
but one which "was made and approved." These had
to be mentioned to be provided for.
And then the other reference which is relied upon
to support this theory of incorporation by refrence
(R. 20):
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"The settlement, payments and distribution
and provision for distribution made pursuant to
the order herein of February 27, 1945, and as
hereinabove set forth is approved and allowed."
Nothing is said "hereinabove" in this decree about any
acceptance by these heirs, and nothing about any condition precedent to the distribution made. It was made,
then. And if there had been a condition to the completion of this contract, there certainly was plenty of
occasion and opportunity for the parties, or the Courts,
to have said so.
Anyway what the F·ebruary order itself said, in
directing "the manner of disbursement," as all the
parties had agreed it should (R. 87) was (R. 96), as
above quoted, that the administrators upon making
the money available to the "sources" authorized to deliver it would be relieved of "further responsibility therefor." And the final decree recited that funds for
this had been made available, and then it discharqed
the administrators.
And when this final decree approved the "payments" and "provision for distribution made pursuant
to the order herein of February 27," it was, of course,
referring to this specific direction as to payment and
distribution and to its order making absolute distributtion of $2,000.00 to each of these heirs.
What the Court in this decree did say and do, is at
total variance with appellants' contention. It referred
to the agreement "made and approved" as one whPrPh~·
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said four heir~ were to receive the $10,000.00 "as their
full share and in settle1nent of the claiins of each and
all of said heirs against this said estate," and then goes
on to recite the payments theretofore made thereunder,
including the $500.00 each which had been forwarded,
as arranged by their representative, through the express
company.

It. in harmony with the prior order, recited (R. 127)
he was to receive the balance of his fee "when the prior
distribution to each of said three heirs is completed."
The decree also, after reciting that there was no
cash in the estate to pay the balance of the money due
on this distribution, recited that the widow had
"deposited with the Utah Savings and Trust Company"
the cash for these heirs and that this money for the
heirs and their representative (R. 127) was "to be transmitted to the said remaining heirs and paid to their
attorney, in the manner heretofore ordered herein."
And that, as quoted by appellants, their representative was "to render the additional services required in
arranging and insuring the receipt by the heirs of the
amount to which each is entitled to receive under said
settlement." And 'also said, after reciting the use of
the N. Y. Bank and the express company as in the prior
order, that this representative was to be entitled to
the balance of his fee when such manner of payment was
completed. Thus, this Court, in referring to payments
in the manner "heretofore ordered herein," referred
to and covered all the provision of the order of Feb.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
27, 1945 as to the manner of disbursen1ent of these funds,
but no conditions.

All this was consistent only with performance of
a completed and approved agreement and it is useless
to 'argue that either the Court or the parties intended
to, or did adopt any interpretation contrary to this.
Furthermore, the Court, again acting consistently
with the prior order that the making of funds available
for such distribution "shall relieve the administrators
herein from further responsibility therefor," said
(R. 133):
"It is further ORDERED that the said Utah
Savings and Trust Company and Virginia Latsis,
be and they are hereby disch'arged."
This decree was signed and entered Oct. 9, 1945.
Coming to the cases cited (p. 20) under this point
we have no doubt that a Court "may incorporate the
provisions of the will" by "express terms" as was done
in the Horton case there cited, and, of course, agree to
the propriety of "resorting to a will to explain and
interpret the decree" in respect to matters referred to
in both.
We deny that there is any "rule of law" or an~·
authority for the claim that a decree by simply referring
to a former proceeding or document approves and
adopts everything that happened or which occurs therein.
And, particularly, we deny that a decree can be
assumed to have adopted a disputed construction of a
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clause in a prior document when the whole decree and

all that it does or s'ays is inconsistent with such construction. 'Ye like son1e of the language of the Ewer
case they cite (p. 23) that "a single phrase * * * apart
fron1 the context* * *indefinite in itself" should not
upset the plain meaning of 'a whole decree. And here
the disputed clause is not even in the decree being interpreted, but, of course, such a clause would have been if
such disputed condition had been intended to apply to it.
Just as absurd, is the position taken by appellants
(p. 23) that the decree of distribution which unconditionally (R. 128) said the balance of the properties
"are hereby distributed" to the widow, was not intended
to take effect until every one of these heirs h'ad accepted
his money.
POINT III
This point again assumes the complete correctness
of their first two points, and then again proceeds on
the assumption that there has been no settlement at all.
This emphasizes the inconsistency of quoting and
relying upon a so-called "condition", which, they say,
was a part of the agreement their representative made,
and at the same time arguing that no agreement at all
was made.
It would seem that if the agreement of settlement
was n1ade and approved by the Court that all the relief
appellants can have is the money which they may accept
and give the receipts which the Court directed them to
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give (R. 97). Because, as the appellants quote in their
brief (p. 30), the "Court has inherent power to enforce
its order."
Another thing thrown in to aid the confusion ( p. :2S)
deals with the authority of Mr. C-~1 again. This halfway assumes his authority to represent the heirs who
were such at the time of his appointment and of the
distribution of the estate, but says that: "Nick J. Latsis
died leaving as his two minor children, John Nikolaou
Latsis and Panagiotou Latsis, * * *. Mr. Cotro-Manes
was not appointed to represent these minors or the heirs
or the estate of Nick J. Latsis and could thus in no way
stipulate on behalf of these minors in regard any settlement agreement."
This not only entirely disregards the realities of
the appointment when the father was alive, but of the
settlement which Mr. C-M did agree to and of his entire
representation of the people then interested in making
this agreement, and his efforts thereafter, and in recognition thereof in making partial payment according to
said ·settlement and the final order of the Court thereon,
but it also ignores the order of the Court made to cover
this exact situation (R. 97), as follows:
"It is further ORDERED that if either of
the above-named heirs shall have or shall become
deceased before such distribution, that the said
Hellenic Bank Trust Company, or the American
Express Company, may be authorized to make
delivery and payment to the heirs at law by
succession of any such named heir who shall
have or shall become ~o deceased."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
And also our statute 75-12-7, to the san1e effect.
l)nder this point the brief, in a totally irrelevant
and perhaps inadvertent assertion, reveals the rea:son
for the attack on this final decree, as well as what is
really aimed at; it says:
"The real properties of the estate have
greatly appreciated in value since 1944 * * * ."
And then pursuing this under Point IV, which we
will later notice, they argue that the administrators
must give them part of the real property.

Appellants $10,000.00 Settlement was Fair
"\Ye cannot resist answering briefly the effort here
to influence the Court by the claim of appellants' brief
(p. 27) that these heirs were shorted by the settlement
their representative made for them.
It is said that their calculations show that each of
the four heirs share should have been $4,916.20 instead
of the "stipulated * * * $2,000.00." The stipulation settlement was actually $10,000.00 for the four, or $2,500.00
each.
The gross amount of the estate figure taken is that
shown in the inheritance tax appraisement of $79,829.11
(R. 99). These figures were set up April 12, 1945, some
time after the settlement. The Court at that time had
on file only the appraisal by its appraisers (R. 38) in
the gross amount of $76,209.16. Both of these totals
contain the $12,000.00 which had been in litigation and
as to which the trial Court, as above pointed out, ex-
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pre-ssly found that this amount in decedent's bank
account came by inheritance to the widow, from her
mother and although it was first ordered to belong to
the estate on a technicality, that order was reversed as
to the estate. Appellants have taken no recognition of
this item in making their claim here and while their
representation to this Court is by no means as bad as
that pre-sented to the trial Court (R. 169) in their petition, which the trial Court dismissed, it is still not fair,
nor correct.
The deductions of the widow's one-third (1;3) and
of the expenses of probate stated in the brief are correct
but it appears in the record and has been called to the
attention of appellants' representatives here that there
are other items of expense. The item of $1,636.45, which
is not included in their deductions, was for State Inheritance Tax (R. 98).
It does not take in other items of expense, a principal one of which is the F·ederal Inheritance Tax payment
which we have been unable to immediately locate in
the record, but which was considered and not disputed
in the trial Court as $2,221.04. Since this estate was
settled long before the marital deduction now allowed
on federal e-state taxes, it is apparent to the Court that
it would be at least in that amount. These two items
alone total $3,857.49.
To the appraised value they add the total ''rent
collections," of $9,771.32, without making any allowance
for expenses at all. The record shows that all that wa~
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collected was paid out, but does not show the total that
''"as used fr01n these collections for repairs, operations
or expenses. ~Ir. C-~I did ascertain and represent to
the Court that the farms had operated "at a loss"
(R. 249)
And these heirs' representative claimed nothing by
reason of possible operation income (R. 253) because
no one knew how that 'vas going to come out.
\Ye point out also as another single item to be considered and which was to be considered, and which was
considered on the settlement, the $12,000.00 (R. 80)
included in the inventory as the value of Black Rock
Beach Co. stock. While an outlawed mortgage of
$9,670.00 (R. 81) was deducted in arriving at the above
gross appraisal of $79,829.11. This $12,000.00 stock
item was not deducted. This corporation did not own
the Black Rock real estate which is "Black Rock" and
inventoried separately (R. 78-79). This corporation was
an operating company.
On the hearing Mr. C-M, who showed that he had
made thorough investigation of the assets and the possibility of expenses and losses, discussed the real estate
(R. 245) and showed that the bulk of this was a onehalf interest in an .old business property, which was
somewhat in jeopardy. He pointed out (R. 244) that
if any of the real estate could be sold it could not then
be sold for cash and that by this settlement these appellants were guaranteed $10,000.00 regardless of any losses
or fluctuations or expenses. It will be recalled that the
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widow accepted these risks, and assumed all expenses
and costs.
He also told the Court and it was true (R. 2-t5) that
this Black Rock Beach Co. stock was 99% owned by the
estate; that it had operated at a "considerable loss" the
previous year; and that additional cash would have to
be raised by assessment and put up if it continued to
operate at all. It would seem that when representations
as to actual values were made here appellants would
have told exactly the extent of what that stock loss
has been. But, outside of all of this, let's now take the
figures that we have and take the full gross as set up
by plaintiffs :
Gross Estate ........................................................................ $79,829.11
Add full rent collection -without any deductions........ 9,771.32
TOTAL .................................................................................. $89,600.43
Deduct the widow's $12,000.00, not belonging to the
estate ............................................................................ 12,000.00
$77,600.43
Deduct widow's portion of real estate, as agreed to
by plaintiffs, not inherited ........................................ 18,753.00
$58,847.43
Deduct expenses of administration, as agreed................ 12,350.24
$46,497.19
Deduct widow's first portion, by succession...................... 25,000.00
$21,497.19
Deduct State Inheritance Taxes and Federal Inheritance Taxes, not included in expenses......................

3,857.49

$17,639.70
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Of which these four heirs would he entitled to lj2 or
$8,819.S5. So that if we stop at this point, and we cannot see how the above iterns can be disputed, the settlement of $10,000.00 agreed upon is almost $1,200.00 more
than the value left. If we were to deduct even one-half
of the $12,000.00 appraised value given to the Black
Rock Company's stock it would leave only $5,800.00 on
the highest valuation claimed for all four of these heirs.
And if rents collected were used for operating expenses
or losses nothing is left.
The remaining matter to be noticed under this point
(p. :28) is the incorrect statement that if Mr. C-M represented these heirs at all "such representation and the
stipulation* * *were effective only until notice could be
given to all of the heirs in Greece and until those heirs
had opportunity to affirm the stipulation." But, as
stated, all statutory notices w~re given and Mr. C-M,
pursuant to the agency given him by the Statute 75-1425, participated in all these "settlements, partitions and
distributions," and represented these heirs just as the
statute authorized. He, in fact, promoted and brought
about the very things now complained about. Notice to
the heirs didn't affect his authority.
The further statement in this connection (p. 28)
that the "minor heirs" or the "estate" of Nick Latsis,
who was himself alive when tliis settlement and final
distribution were made, could, after his death, disaffirm
it all because of lack of notice to them is too absurd to
discuss.
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The two cases cited at this point (p. 28-29) have
simply no relation at all to the preceding staten1ents
made, neither in the parts quoted, nor in any other part,
so far as we can see.
The Smith case decided the point that a settlement
made for a minor, but not by any legal representative
of his, still had to be repudiated in a reasonable time
after he. came of age.
The quotation under the citation of the Lupton case
is a part of the Note in A.L.R. cited at 979 on this case.
Of 'Course, we don't have matters of confidential relationship, or of fraud or unconscionable practice, and the
Lupton case holds that if we did the agreement would
still not be void. A mere reading of the portion of the
note preceding that quoted will show the absolute
inapplicability of anything in that case.
Then referring to the law, the brief (p. 29) states
that Utah Law "did appear" to be clear that the administrator cannot be discharged until the estate has been
fully administered. We simply assert that an administrator is discharged and his powers and duties end, when
the District Court discharges him and distributes the
estate from his control. If the Court errs in such distribution and discharge that, of course, is another matter,
but the decree stands until it is appealed or a:ttacked,
and reversed. And the Utah cases cited do not support
their statement, or conflict with the statement just
made by us.
In Re Barker's Guardianship quotes a concurring
statement by Justice \Volfe, but does not :-~tate the
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ground of the decision. There the defendant guardian
had been collecting disability payn1ents for his ward in
excess of $400.00 and had paid only $50.00 to the ward.
Upon a doetor's certificate of restored competency to
the ward, the guardian applied for and obtained an order
of discharge. ~-\.n affidavit was filed, and an order to
show cause entered and then the case was tried. 'rhis
Court says:
"as though a suit had been brought."
It then cites another Utah case and says that that
case held that where "'issues were properly drawn by
appropriate pleadings, although it was not error to
proceed to dispose of the contested question," it should
be done aceording to the procedure of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this case the trial proceeded without the
question of procedure being raised.
The second distinguishing feature pointed out by
this Court is the application of 102-13-45 R.S.U. 1933
(now 7.5-13-45) which is quoted and which provides that
"upon complaint by any * * * ward * * * against
anyone, suspected of having* * * embezzled or
conveyed away any of the money, * * *belonging
to the ward * * * may ci'te such suspected person
to appear before it * * * and proceed with hin1 on
such charge" etc.
This makes it clear that this case never said or decided
that an administrator here could not be discharged even
if he still had possession of property of the estate, and
since the record shows that this administrator had no
:-~ueh possession because of the distribution by the Court
prior to its discharge, and there is no claim that it now
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has such possession, that case has no bearing. Judge
\Volfe's comment quoted, simply adds that the Court
may enforce its order independently of this statute.
There is no order of the Probate Court as to this
administrator which is attempted to be here enforced.
The other Utah case cited for this so-called same
rule (p. 30) is the Brooks' Estate case. We have no
argument with the quotation. But here the Court
specifically found that all of the real properties of the
estate had been distributed by it and all other properties
turned over by the administrators in accordance with
the orders of the Court (R. 128). The Brooks' Estate
case never discusses the point that the Court "cannot
discharge" an administrator until he has finished administration, as con'tended by appellants. But, in that case,
and exactly contrary to said contention, the Court cited
the administrator to show cause why his appointment
should not be revoked for certain defaults. He thereupon resigned and this case is entirely devoted to the
matter of requiring him to turn over to his successor
ad1ninistrator 1nonies of the estate in his possession.
As stated by this Court (30 P.2 at 1068) the question
was did "the Court below * * * require appellant to
deliver to the new appointed administrator more property * * * than came into his possession as adminisb·ator."
The remaining statements under this point are
repetitions which have already been answered.
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POINT IV
Under this point appellants argue (R. :t2) that they
are entitled to have delivered to them their proportionate
share of the real property estate as if no order of distribution had been made.
They gave this Court no clue as to what this administrator could possibly do to accomplish this son1e eight
years after it has had any control of the property and
after its distribution to private ownership.
What they here appear to contend, that seen1s new
or different, is that the Court, except by getting conveyances of the '•real property" from each heir, could
not, and, therefore, did not 1nake any distribution, and
did not close the estate.
The statement quoted (p. 32) fr01n the Chamberlain
case that "any property" of a decedent vests immediately
in his heirs, "subject to administration and the payn1ent
of debts" may, in some sense and for the purposes of
that case, be correct. But, that any particular property
may never reach them because of its being "subject to
administration," is abundantly clear.
The only thing that this Chamberlain case held on
this was that the plaintiff heirs of a decedent had ~uf
ficient interest to entitle them to contest a deed executed by such decedent, on ground of non-delivery thereof.
So this statement was not necessary, and doesn't aid
appellant. And, by 73-11-3, heirs are expressly given
this authority in quiet title actions back as far as 1898
when this provision was first enacted.
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Then they cite (p. 32) Sec. 75-12-15, and this simply
says that "partition or distribution" of the real estate
1nay be made as in this chapter provided to persons to
whmn it has been '·conveyed"by heirs, and that such
shall be "assigned" to those entitled. They then argue.
frmn this that shares of the estate, as referred to, can't
be divested except by a conveyance, and, of course, this
statute doesn't say that at all.
Statutes illustrating the error of the broad claim of
the definite investment of title in the heirs, and that
such cannot be divested except by their conveyance, are
quite numerous. For example:
75-8-1 authorizes the Court to entirely exhaust the

estate as to all heirs except the spouse, by "family
allowances" to her; and 75-8-1 authorizes the same by
"summary distribution."
Then, 75-9-21 and other sections provide for such
"divesting" by sales to pay funeral expenses or debts,
old or new, and sales of real estate for these and other
purposes, or even for distribution of the proceeds from
real estate or other property, are authorized hy 75-10-1
and succeeding sections.
And, property in naine of decedent may be afterwards conveyed by or under the direction of the Probate
Court to any person entitled to have such property
under 75-11-26 and 27, though legal title was vested
in the decedent.
i~

The exclusive right of possession by 75-11-13, which
ordinarily a right attaching to title, is not in the heir:-;,
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but it is in the administrators until final distributon and
turning over; and under 7.5-1.:!-9 nothing n t all may vest
in an heir where the decedent has nmde advancements
to him prior to death.
Before discussing the application of s01ne n1ore
directly pertinent sections on this, we call attention to
what appellants are claiming they are entitled to here,
and to the impossibility of giving it to them. This claim
that the share of each heir in1mediately vests, and that
each heir is entitled to have it remain vested so far as it
depends upon any statute or the Chamberlain or other
cases referred to, applies alike to real property and
personal property, so far as we can see. How is it that
their claimed interest becomes real instead of personal
property. We merely point this out, although it may
have no particular importance. But what is it that
appellants expect to get by continuing this probate, if
it were opened up1
The total inventory which they have referred to in
presenting their claim as to valut of the properties of
the estate (R. 100) is $80,000.00 in round numbers. We
are not agreed as to what portion of all the estate would
have gone to these collateral heirs according to these
values, but we believe that we have demonstrated above
that it would not exceed $10,000.00. This is Ys of the
gross value, to the four of them, and each 1ft_ of Ys is 1j32
and one 1j64 in each of Nick J.'s two minor children.
Looking at the 1natter from the standpoint of proportionate value, since each of these four, on this valu-
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ation, would be entitled to about $2,000.00 out of the
$80,000.00 of property, each of these would have a 1j40th
interest and each of Nick J's children a 1j80th one.
And by their contention, this interest is in each and
every piece of property, and it is beyond the power of
the Court to get it out of any piece of property except
by conveyance.
\Vith this in mind, we invite the Court to look at
the list of these properties (R. 77-81) and try to figure
out how the Court could give one of thse heirs any benefit at all frmn a 1j32nd or a 1j80th in any of the Butlerville properties in the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon
or in the so-called Black Rock near the shore of Great
Salt Lake, or in any other or all of these listed properties. The Court would have to do something about
exactly as was arranged here in order to give these
foreign heirs any possible benefit frorn this estate whatsoever.
\Ve point out also here, and before proceeding to
the statutes which authorize this, to additional complications which cannot be ignored. The character of the real
estate belonging to this estate, and some of the complications with relation to it, and particularly the impossibility in 1944 of selling any part of it outright for cash,
was gone into at some length by Mr. C-M in presenting
the appellants' proposal of compromise and settlement
to the Court (R. 245-249). He said that none of the
real estate could be sold outright for cash, but if sold
could only be sold on a cash down-payment and future
installment payment plan.
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Thus, nobody can tell how much of this real estate
it would have been necessary to sell under 7;>-10-1 to
get cash to distribute to the collateral heirs, whether
their proportion to be distribttted, absent the settlement,
would have been Inore or less than $10,000.00.
So, as represented to the Court, and particular!~· to
try and help these heirs when n1oney would have been
of the gratest benefit to them, their representative
worked out an arrangen1ent by which the widow provided the cash, and the bank acknowledged the deposit
thereof to the credit of their representative and for
their use and benefit. Now of the money available and
so provideo, $:.?,000.00 was paid to the decedent's brother
here and Mr. C-M has apparently received his full
$2,000.00. It is interesting, in this connection, to note
that he, after the deposit, served notices as to this on
the Utah Savings and Trust Company (R. 148), as a
bank, and no longer dealt with it as an administrator.
Also, as the decree pointed out, $1,500.00 additional
had been withdrawn by him and forwarded through the
"sources," as directed by the Court, to these heirs in
Greece before the estate was closed. True, this ca111e
back and was re-deposited in the saving account held
in the bank for these people. But, assuming that this
Court could and it did attempt to give these interests in
the real estate to one or more of these heirs, what
becomes of this money and who is entitled to it~ And,
also, what about the money paid out~
The suggestion of the appellants' brief is that the
brother here who took his $2,000.00 doesn't get in on
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any assumed "increased value" In real estate, which
they are striving for; nor will any other of these collateral heirs who has or does become bound to the settlement; and so, if there is one who doesn't sign up the
Court has to look after his VESTED interest in all of
these properties.
We confidently assert that the law and our statutes
do not require any such insane handling of such small
fractional interests and that no Court controlling an
estate, or any competent representative engaged in
administering it, would willingly consent to any such
handling of such matter.
We call attention now to the following statutes dealing with such situations:
"75-12-12. Partition by referees. - Whenever it is impracticable or inconvenient for the
court to make a complete partition among all the
parties in the first instance, or on petition of any
interested person, the court, having first ascertained and determined the shares or interests of
the persons entitled, may appoint one or more
dis-interested persons to act as referees for the
purpose of making the partition.
"75-12-16. When partition impracticable When the real estate cannot be divided without prejudice or inconvenience to the owners,
the court may assign the whole to one or more
of the parties entitled to share therein who
will accept it. The parties accepting the whole
must pay to the other parties interested their just
proportion of the true value thereof, or secure
the same to their satisfaction, or in case of the
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Ininority of such party, to the satisfaction of
guardian and the court having jurisdiction of
guardianship n1atter; and the true value of
estate umst be ascertained and reported by
referees. * * *"

his
the
the
the

"73-1:2-17. Partition- Set off to partyPayment.-When any tract of land or tenen1ent
is of greater value than any one person's share
in the same estate to be divided, and it cannot
be divided without injury to the same, it may be
set off by the referees appointed to 1nake partition to any of the parties who will accept it."

The foregoing statutes call for and permit use by
the Court of referees to be appointed to aid in fixing
values of interests as partitioned to heirs, but we do
not have that problem or that necessity because, as we
have pointed out, the parties here all fully agreed on
the partition matters, and the Court, after full inquiry
(R. 252), accepted this agreement, and distribution.
This was all done in matters of "settlements, partitions
and distribution of estates" to which the Court, by
75-14-25, had appointed the representative of these very
appellants, with authority so to agree. It would have
been idle and useless to then appoint a referee. And by
accepting the values agreed to by the appointed representative, the Court was enabled to give these foreign
heirs some consolidated value and benefit from their
inheritance, which they could use.

And, we ask the Court to particularly note that
under none of these statutes is it required tha.t any 7z eir
make any conveyance of anything. So tha.t all of them
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ref'Ltte appellants' contention on this.
They empower the Court to avoid an "ilnpracticable
or inconvenient" partition under 75-12-12, or "prejudice
or inconvenience" to owners in distribution under 7512-16, and to give lands having a greater value than one
heir's interest therein to another heir in making distribution under 75-12-17; and, also, to give the full recognition to the statutory authority of the representatives
of minor and foreign heirs in all "settlements, partitions
and distribu,tions" under 75-14-25.
Thus, .if it may be assumed title would pass subject
to ad1ninistration, still it is plain that title to any particular property may be completely divested in administration, as it was here.
The authorities cited by appellants in support of
this point again do not have any bearing although they
serve to indicate that counsel have tried to find something to support them.

In re Mile's Estate, 223 P. 337., cited by them (p.
33) has absolutely nothing to do with any question with
which we are here concerned. It does hold that a purported conveyance of an interest in estate properties
is not a conveyance, if it was not intended as such, but
only intended to be given as security. This, of course, is
sound law and it makes no difference whether the thing
purported to be conveyed is property of an estate or
any other property.
In re Meyer's Estate, 238 P .2d 597, which the
appellants assert {p. 33) held that "distribution of real
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property shall be 1nade only to the heirs," doesn't seem
to discu~~ real property at all, and ~ay~ nothing- about
administrators or Courts being required to distribute
only to the heirs. In that case, two foreign heirs of a
foreign decedent in the enemy country of Gennany
attempted to get rid of their interest in the estate in
order to avoid its seizure by the Attorney General, as
custodian of alien property, in this country during the
war. They sent waivers of their interest in the estate
properties here to two heirs residing in this country.
These tried to assert that that waiver divested the alien
German non-resident heirs and invested those who were
here with the others interest. They also contended that
the interest of the foreign heirs had never vested so as
to become subject to seizure because they had not accepted or claimed it.
So that the Court can now see what the language
quoted from Page 605 of 238 P. (2) had application to.
There is a statement however (P. 605) which would
take this case out of even the appellants' claim as to
what the rule in California is as to agree1nents with other
heirs, as here. The opinion says :
"While the Courts of this state have determined that an heir may sell, assign, hypothecate
or * * * may contract with other heirs with reference thereto * * * the question of whether an heir
succeeding by descent may renounce or disclaim
his inheritance has not been determined in this
state."
This, at least, recognizes that heirs may there contract
with other heirs as was done here.
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The statement (p. 36) that the final decree here did
not determine heirship is just plainly erroneous. It sets
forth the names, relationship and residence of every
heir just as they are now claimed by appellants here
to have been, at page 106, and then in the following pages
states exactly what portions and what properties are
to be received by each.
POINTY
Under this point appellants finally, make some
reference to the order dismissing their petition from
which they have appealed here, and thus they get a little
nearer to the issues involved on this appeal.
However, they still ignore entirely all but two of
the five points of the motion to dismiss which their brief
quotes (p. 10) and refer only indirectly to the two points
not ignored. This motion (R. 153) is one to dismiss for
these reasons:
1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
2. Lack of jurisdiction over the person.
3. Insufficiency of process.
4. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.
5 Failure to join an indispensable party.
These grounds are under our civil procedure and come
under Civil Rule 12 (b).
There is nothing new discussed under this point 5
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diction to enter the final decree of distribution and discharge of the administrators, is here n1ore particularly
emphasized.
This emphasis on jurisdiction, is an effort to have
this Court believe that the Lilnford case, which they cite
(p. 37), is in point here. In so doing they ignore a
number of distinguishing matters and particularly the
statement of this Court in the first paragraph of the
opinion there (207 P.2 at 1033) that:
"The administratrix was not then and has
not yet been discharged."
This discussion also ignore~ statutes affecting their
contention, which is based upon lack of notice and particularly 75-14-25, that the representative of these appellants thereunder appointed, represents them in the very
matters here involved, "and all other proceedings where
notice is required or prescribed."
Since this is the first opportunity that we have had
to support the grounds of our motion, our position will
be clearer if we briefly discuss these grounds in their
order as above stated, and make reference to appellant's
contention there.
1.

Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Subject Ma,tter

The order appealed from dismissed a "petition
directing the Court's attention" (R. 158) to alleged acts
and proceedings in the probate file. This respondent was
brought in only by service of an order to show cause
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(R. 157) served Inore than six years after it had been
expressly discharged.
There were five matters of relief mentioned in the
order to show cause (R. 155) but not one of these is
claimed or discussed here, because appellants apparently
realize that no relief could be granted on any of these.
But the appellants argue throughout and in the
end of the brief (p. 41) seek from this. respondent
"further administration of the estate, including an order
for final distribution in accordance with the laws of
succession." They also describe their petition (p. 41)
as one for completion of the probate proceedings. This
background and their demand that respondent do something here are important.
It is important, also to keep in mind that the charge
that the administrators distributed the estate, or attempted to, and that they should distribute the estate
in some different manner, is entirely erroneous. This
decree distributed the estate, and all of the statutes
relating to distribution refer to it as a function of the
Court, and 75-12-8 provides that after the proportions
or parts are so distributed the heirs may recover possession from the administrator or any person having possession; and Sec. 75-12-4 refers to the Court directing the
adminstrator to deliver possession. These and other
statutes clearly indicate that the Court distributes and
exercises the power of distribution but that the administrator has the right of possession and the duty to deliver
such, upon distribution.
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The $10,000.00 agreed to, was expressly di::·d ributetl
to the four heirs, and deliver~· charged to their agent,
.\[r. C-:\I, by the Court order of Feb. :27, 1945 (R. 9G).
In the final order provision was first n1ade for
taking care of this distribution cmnpletely ( R. l:l.(i-1:27)
and then the order, as to the property now claimed, said:

·•rt is further ordered that all of the remaining properties of the said estate, * * * are hereby
distributed to Virginia Latsis, the surviving wife
of the said decedent."
Now if, when this order to show cause was served
upon this respondent, it had atten1pted to do what
appellants are asking the Court to require it to do, i.e.,
proceed with the administration, what could it have
done~ If it filed another petition for distribution and
got an order from the Court distributing some possible
interest in the property here it would be totally ineffective for that purpose without divesting the parties in
possession and having, at least, an apparent title. Even
assuming that the order of distribution was void, and
that this administrator could be reinstated, he could
make any of the former properties of the estate available to these heirs only by proceedings against such
persons holding it. It is obvious then that if he so
attempted that he would have no interest sufficient to
sustain an action to quiet title, and particularly, to
acquire some small fractional interest therein, as to
which it is claimed, this decree might be voidable or void.
In 75-12-8, which says the Court in the decree n1ust
name the heirs and the parts to which they are entitled,
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says they may "sue for and recover" these from the
administrator or any person having the same in
possession.
They appear to concede that probate proceedings
are in rem, but the crux of their contention (p. 37) is
that the Court couldn't get jurisdiction for this distribution by the ordinary notice because the distribution was
not normal and that any "modified distribution" requires
a notice which fully recites the contents of the petition.
Apparently this, if so, would apply to any distribution on any kind of partition arrangements as contemplated by any of the statutes cited by us under
Point IV.
75-1-7 is one of the first statutes that they run dead
into, because this recites that the Court has jurisdiction
on final distribution without any notice as to it at all.
Because of this and othe-r statutes defeating this claim,
they attempt to escape by asking the Court to now overrule Barrette v. Whitney, 106 P. 522. There, in discussing this, in an action between two property owners, one
of which had acquired some estate property, after a
distribution without any notice, and had sold it to the
other, this Court pointed out that in states whose statutes
or decisions treat these proceedings as in rem the notice
of the appointment of an administrator in the first
place gave jurisdiction, and that such states, even without a statute like ours, have held that notice of distribution was not jurisdictional. The opinion (108 P. at
525) says:
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"In other words, frmn what is there said it
would seem that the notice which is given upon
the filing of the petition for letters of adn1inistration is the jurisdictional notice, the giving of
which, when given as required by the statute,
brings not only the property, but the persons
interested therein, within the jurisdiction of the
Court."
As seems to be agreed, this statute plainly says
that this decree cannot be held void on account of ''any
want of notice." And appellants appear to agree, as
they must, that unless the decree is void it cannot be
collaterally attacked, and even they treat their petition
as such an attack.
We have no jurisdiction of the property which is
"subject matter" of this litigation, and can get none by
this proceeding.
Secondly, this statute, 75-1-7, says that "no objection" can even be taken on account of "want of notice,
defect or irregularity," except on direct application to
the same Court made at any time before distribution,
or on appeal." So this bars them also.
They want this Barrette case reversed, and this
would not help them unless the statute was also repealed.
Bot.h this statute and this case have stood since 1909
when it was decided, and no change of pohcy has been
indicated either by the legislature or by this Court. And,
appellants have cited no decision to the contrary.
They make statements here (p. 39) and on previous
mention (p. 17) that this case has not been followed in
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other jurisdictions and "appears to be contrary" to the
weight of authority. They have cited no state which
has refused to follow this statute, or even any other
state having a similar statute.
They have cited in support of this, 21 Am. Jur. P.
655, Sec. 490. This does not ·support their contention
except where the "statute makes such notice a jurisdictional prerequisite," and a statement directly contrary to that they seek to support is made on the preceding page, 654. The statement of the law there is in
exact accord with that of this Court in the Ba.rrette case.
Now here in the brief do they cite a case involving any
statute at all similar to ours, or any discussion of the
effect or validity of any such statute. We submit, therefore, that this statute alone justifies the order appealed
frmn.
2.

Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person

Under this we will deal only with the jurisdiction
of the respondent here; additional questions as to
parties will be discussed under succeeding grounds. The
appellants have ignored this ground of the motion
entirely although it seems to us to be a propeT ground
of motion and a serious one.
Our statutes appear to recognize a clear distinction
between the settlement of an account in probate and
an order of distribution and discharge insofar as future
proceedings are concerned. This Court has held that
if the administrator has not been discharged an account,
though approved by order of the Court, may under some
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circumstances be opened up and revised or the admini::;trator required to inventory additional properties. See
7.3-11-37 and rases cited. But where the estate has been
finally settled and distributed and the administrator
discharged by decree, no further proceedings can be
taken in the estate by the adn1inistrator. The derree
cannot be attacked collaterally, and the discharged
ad1ninistrator can act only upon reissuance of letters
reauthorizing him to serve as administrator.
See 75-12-20.
Obviously an administrator who has been discharged
could not petition and, therefore·, could not act upon any
petition fileJ in the closed estate without a reissue of
letters.
It appears that Section 75-12-19, which precedes
the section just mentioned, sheds some light upon this,
and also, that this section required the Court to n1ake
the entry of discharge which it did make. Here the estate
had been fully administered and the discharge order was
preceded by an order which entitrely distributed it. Also
everything else had been done and the order recited the
performance of everything else required and the statute
says that then "the Court must make a judgment or
decree discharging him from all liability to be incurred
thereafter."

And the Court (R. 133) entered a specific order
"that the said Utah Savings & Trust Company and
Virginia Latsis be, and they are hereby, discharged."
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It is impossible for us to see how this respondent
has any right or power to proceed in any way with
relation to any of the properties of the former estate,
and it follows that the Court does not have jurisdiction
of him as administrator so as to direct his performance
or any of the duties belonging to that office.
In Banks v. Employers, 4 F.R.D. 179, on a similar
motion, under the same Rule 12, the F·ederal District
Court for Missouri ruled that an administrator after
final settle1nent and discharge could not bring an action
relating to any estate matters without being reappointed
or appointed administrator de bonis non. The case attempted was dismissed on motion. The Court said:
"he can no longer act in his representative capacity."
In Fistel v. Beaver Trust Co., 94 F. Supp. 974, the
Court, under this same rule, held that a person served
in New York could not be held in his capacity as executor, where· the estate was not in New York and he had
not been appointed there.
In Sparnner v. Brandt, D. C. N. Y. 1941, 1 F.R.D. 555,
the Court held that if a defendant is to be sued as a representative so as to bind those for whom it may be· claimed or alleged he is to act, it must be indicated that ilie
defendant is being sued in "representative capacity" and
not in his individual capacity. This bears also on the
next ground discussed.
3. Insufficiency of Process
This ground goes to the procedure attempted here
of filing a petition in a closed estate, to commence a
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case against a fonner administrator therein, who has
been expressly discharged.

Ciril Rules 3 and 4, under "Comn1ence1nent of Action" and "Process'', provide for a cmnplaint which shall
set forth the names of all the parties and the aver1nent
of claims, and for service of su1nmons entitled similarly
to the complaint, and that the Court "shall have jurisdiction from the ti1ne of filing of the cmnplaint or the service of the summons."
Thus, the parties are defined, the issues are defined
and limited by this, and subsequent pleadings provided
for and the subsequent rules as to intervening parties,
or the bringing in of necessary parties can be applied,
so that the whole matter involved can be settled.
We have noted the provisions of 75-14-23 that "mistakes in settlement" may be corrected "at any time before final settlement and discharge, and after that time
by an action in equity."
This Court has held that under this statute a decree
of distribution may be set aside only in an action in
equity. In re Estate of Rice, 111 U. 428, 182 P. 2d 111;
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 U. 128, 158 P. 705. This
also is the general rule.
21 .Am.

Jur., 654, Sec. 488.

Civil Rule 60 (b) is the rule dealing with relief frmn
a final judgment and it recites seven different grounds
upon which a motion may be made for such relief, none
of which is taken by the appellants here, and says, with
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reference to fraud, whether "denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic", the motion must be brought within "not more
than 3 months after the judg1nent * * * was entered or
taken." It then recites that pending such n1otion the
••finality of a judgn1ent" is not suspended. That, of
course, would mean that this estate would still be distributed and closed and the ad1ninistrators discharged,
when appellants petition was filed. The rule then says:
"The procedure for obtaining any relief from
a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action."
The reason for the rule now requiring procedure
by "independent action" in equity is well illustrated by
the confusion here brought about.
11 his respondent was cited on Nov. 1, 1951 (R. 157)
simply by service of an order to show cause why it
should not proceed with the probate proceedings closed
more than six years before. Our motion to dismiss was
filed (R. 155) Nov. 20, 1951. On their petition a copy
of lis jJendens was filed, Nov. 1, 1951 (R. 150), describing all the real property mentioned and distributed
Oct. 9, 1945.

'V e were the only party and the only administrator
then or in the year 1951 served at all. And, as the record
shows, and as it already appears heTein, we had no
control over the properties previously distributed and
now in private ownership, and there was nothing that
we rould do, if we had tried, to comply with the petition or order, whether we were ordered hy the Court,
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or atten1pted ourselves to cmnply. Any action to divest
title to real estate or to quiet title against any claim,
or any settlement of such, could not be had by us.
In fact, the record showed no authority in the petitioner, Attorney Arnovitz, to then represent the appellants. Of course, l\Ir. C-Thi still represented them, under
the statutory amend1nent. The other fornwr joint
administrator had not been served, and nobody could
be bound by the procedure taken against this respondent and, of course, any right of action against it must
be determined as of the time this action was attempted,
against it.
Nor could this respondent bring in either the representative of these appellants who had procured the settlement complained about, and whose authority and
conduct are qustioned by appellants' brief (p. 34) so
as to fix responsibility for the agreement made by him,
and for the decree consented to. And it could not bring
in the owners or purported owners of the lands involved
at all.
There was, on March 5, 1952, a withdrawal (R. 173)
filed by Mr. C-:M, and then by an order dated Aug. 1,
1952 (R. 176) the attorneys who had filed the petition
hack in 1951 were appointed as the attorneys for the
appellants here. They were not the authorized attorneys
before, because Mr. C-M was the attorney and they
could not substitute themselves for hin1 under the provisions of 78-51-34, at least until his withdrawal.
This withdrawal, however, did not and could not
relieve him from the provisions of fhe order or the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54

decree requ1nng him to "arrange for and insure" the
payn1ent of the 1noney on deposit to these heirs, for which
services he had been paid. And, of course, there is no
claim by him, or at all, that it did.
Now, as further wrong process and confusion, on
Aug. 1, 1952 appellants filed another copy of their petition (R. 183), and another order to show cause was
issued. So that, another case, if they could so start a
case at all, was then started. So, from this, we had
two separate fonner ad1ninistrators, neither one of which
could ever act alone, involved in separate actions,
separate motions to dismiss and separate orders; and
the first one against this respondent involves a somewhat different situation because of intervening things,
and some different questions of authority of attorneys,
as noted above. And, in neither action can the appellants
obtain any relief, that we can conceive of.
The service of process attempted on this second
order to show cause is noteworthy.
On this the Sheriff got in to this confusion of proceeding against departed administrators, and served
the summons upon the departed decedent himself. The
return said (R. 182) that he had "served the same upon
the within named defendant, John James Latsis, hy
showing the original and delivering to • • • said defendant personally * * * a true eopy of said order.'' If
appellants' contentions are correct, we don't see anything wrong about this. The decedent is just a~ logical
a "defendant" in this as is either of these former administrators.
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And now, after the orders of the Court here
appealed from were entered below, and after the notice
of appeal herein (R. 209) was served and filed, we have
still another of the smne kind of petitions (R. 212) by
one Sigmund Helwing, as administrator of Nick J. Latsis
and as guardian of his minor children, and another like
order to show cause, issued (R. 228) January 26, 1953.
If such "cases" can be so brought in a closed probate
proceeding, when do they stop~ Is this not an admission on our motion, that necessary parties plaintiff weTe
not before the Court, and also that any decree entered
on the first petition and order to show cause would not
hind anybody!
This presents still a different kind of case, because
here is a further question of authority and representation, and as to getting title to the real properties aimed
at, this case is started more than 7 years after the
distribution, and, therefore, presents new defenses by
parties who have been in possession.
Appellants attempt to escape this situation and the
statutes and decisions supra by reliance upon, In re
Linford's Estate, 207 P. 2d 1033, which they cite (p. 37)
and quote briefly. There weTe three equal heirs, and
the sister filed a petition, had herself appointed as
administratrix, listed only part of the properties at
reducd values, did not list the complaining brother as
an heir at all, and thus, kept him from receiving any
notice and thus kept him away from Court, which is
extrinsic fraud, and obtained sumrnary distribution to
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herself of the whole estate. The Court, in the first
paragraph of the opinion says:
"The administratrix was not then and has
not yet been discharged."
Then, (207 P. :!d 1035), in citing a \Yashington case
in support of its decision, this Court said that the proceeding could be taken by petition though the administrator's final account had been settled by the Court,
"the administrator, not having been discharged, should
be required to administer the omitted property." \Ve
have admitted, of course, and the rules that we have
relied upon permit correction of the account before final
settlement, but not even this can be done after discharge
of the adininistrator. And no case has been cited that
then authorizes the procedure attempted here.
Furthermore, in this Li.nford case there was no
question of parties, everyone intere·sted, either as
administrators or heirs, were there represented and the
properties involved were all in the hands of the administratrix who was an heir too, and under the Court's
jurisdiction and control, and all matters could be given
complete and final settlement.
It cannot be too often en1phasized that this is not
a case, where (1) probate proceedings were still pending when respondent was served; or (2) where all necessary parties were before the Court; or, (3) where the
properties or the parties holding them are before or
within the jurisdiction of the Court~ or (4) where the
parties had already joined issues and voluntarily liti-
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gated a non-probate 1natter, like quieting· title.
In re Martin Esta.te, Utah 194G, 166 P.:2d 197.)

( ~ee

Cases involving such situationt:', therefore, have no
application here.
And, the Court also points out in the Linford cases
that it had previously decided In re Raleigh's Estate
that even the "account is conclusive as to all iten1s
included there, provided that the statutory requirement
of notice has been complied with, and no heir or party
is laboring under any legal disability, unless {he settlement is set aside in a proceeding in equity * * * zJrosecuted as are proceedings to set aside other judgment.~."
Appellants quote (p. 38) this portion of the opinion
from the Raleigh case as it was there quoted by this
Court, and then try to escape by emphasizing that the
quotation said "provided that the statutory requirement
of notice has been complied with." They make no contention that anyone here was laboring under a legal
disability and, of course, they were not. And they have
not shown that any statutory requirement of notice
was not complied with. The record shows in every
instance where notice was required that it was given
as the statute provided.
Furthermore, and this is very vital on this as we
have attempted to point out, everything that appellants
are cmnplaining about and everything that they want
by their complaint is encompassed in the words of 7514-25 "settlements, partitions and distributions of estate
* * * and all other proceedings where notice is required
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to prescribed" and the statute expressly says that in
all such things l\1:r. C-:JI was here "authorized to represent such parties."
Thus, it is ridiculous to argue lack of notice of
proceedings which this representative promoted and
brought about and participated in.
In any event, this final judgment cannot now be
attacked by the PROCESS here attempted.
4. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can
Be Granted.
This is a very important ground of our motion to
dismiss, because if we are right as to any of appellants'
five points discussed above, or as to any of the other
four grounds of our motion, and we think we are correct
as to each and all of these, then the Court was right in
sustaining this fourth ground of our motion also, because
the petition did not state a claim upon which relief can
be qranted. In addition to these, we desire to mention
another matter showing such failure.
There is no extrinsic fraud alleged in the petition
or here claimed. And since the Court clearly had jurisdiction of the estate and had entered its final decree
this, no matter what the process or procedure attempted,
could not be set aside except for extrinsic fraud.
In Glorer v. Gloz·er (1952), 242 P. 2d 298, thi~ Court.
discussed this question quite thoroughly in an estate
1na tter and so held. This case discusses the leading
case of r.s. v. Throckmorton and holds the rule of that
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case applicable to judg1nent in probate proceedings, a~
do other Courts. This Court also quotes and approves
the definition of extrinsic fraud fr01u the A.L.R. An Jlotation F ol. 113, P. 1:2.·1.;, as follows:
" 'Extrinsic fraud 1nust consist of s01ne act
ulterior to tne 1nerits of the proceeding out of
which the judgment arose, by which the party
attacking the judgment was prevented from presenting his case or was induced not to present it.
Such fraud consists of something done by the
successful party, preventing the adverse party
from presenting all of his case to the court, so
that there was, in fact, no adversary trial or
decision of the issue in that case.'"
Since this case refers to some prior Utah cases it is
not necessary to cite further authority.
In Hammell v. Britton, 119 P.2d 333, a case cited
by our Supreme Court on this question, the California
Court emphasizes that as to extrinsic fraud the facts
"must be pleaded with particularity and specificality."
It also has a good statement distinguishing extrinsic and
intrinsic fraud. Here, of course, no fraud is pleaded.
This failure to allege extrinsic fraud in the present case
presents a solid barrier to appellants here and independently of everything else, justifies the order dismissing their petition.
Before leaving this point and to avoid any mis-understanding, we also point out that the Court n1ay
take judicial knowledge of what the record here shows.
All of the matters of notice, orders, decrees here
involved are contained in the complete record which is
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before the Court. We point this out because the petition here makes a number of statements which the
record proves to be erroneous. For example; the statement therin (R. 163-64) that when the final decree was
entered the administrator knew the money sent by appellants' representative to them in Greece had not been
accepted. The record (R. 137) shows that this was not
returned and re-deposited until sometime after. Likewise, the statement (R. 166) "that the $1500.00 so sent
was never out of possession" of the administrators. It
wa~ made entirely available to appellants' attorney and
representative for delivery through the Express Company or New York bank, as directed by the Court, and
respondent was relieved of further responsibility and
discharged.
Also, the statement (R. 171) that the Court "has
not entered a final order discharging the administrators
of the estate," whereas there was an order expressly
di.,charging them (R. 131). These are not all, but they
me some samples.
It is true that the appellants' brief does not now
as~ert or rely upon such statements in the petition. In
fact, they scarcely refer in their brief here to their
petition at all. The point we make, however, as to an~'
and all statements in the petition, or in the brjef, contrar:v to what the Court ma)' take judicial notice of, are
not admitted by our motion and can be given no effect
here, but must be treated as mere nullities.
;>;)( i,

French v. Senate, (Cal.), 80 P. 1031, 69 L.R.A.
a leading case.
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State v. Bates. :22 lJ. 65, 61 P. 902.
Utah Power (f· Lt. Co. l'. Richmond Irr. Co., 80 U.
105, 13 P. 2d 320.
78-25-1 U.C.A. 1953.

20 Am. Jur., P. 104.

State v. Rolio, 71 U. 91, 262 P. 987, where this
Court said:

"* * * and what is judicially known may not
be controverted by pleadings, or made issuable
by them."
5.

Fail1.tre to Join an Indispensible Party.

This ground has been covered in the discussion of
the other grounds, above.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it can, we think, be safely asserted
that appellants have not shown that any Court has
heretofore been asked to, or ever has entertained such
a petition filed in a former probate proceeding theretofore closed by a formal final decree, and seeking to
gain title or quiet title to real estate likewise forn1ally
distributed six years prior thereto, and which petition
is directed to a former administrator, likewise by such
decree, theretofore discharged.
On the 1nerits of their contention we believe it is
established that the ntere statement in the stipulation
that certain documents if signed would bind the heirs
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signing, was not intended to prevent the stipulated
settlement from then taking effect; and, if it was at
first so intended, this was changed by the acts and
conduct of all the same parties who had signed this
stipulation, and was not carried forward as a condition
to the finality of the decree thereafter agreed to, entered,
and accepted and acted upon by all.
That :.Mr. Cotro-~1anes was fully qualified and
authorized to represent and act for the minor and
foreign heirs, and all the interests claimed by appellants,
and in all the "settlements, partitions and distributions"
agreed to and finally made. And, in fact, in doing all
that is now complained of, and that respondent could
not then or now control or limit the authority of appellants' representative. And that it cannot be made
responsible therefor in this proceeding.
That not only is the process and the procedure
attempted here erroneous, and futile, but that the things
pretended to be sought by way of fractional interests
in scattered properties would be of no value to appellants, and could not sensibly be permitted as a di~tri
bution.
Also, that any interest in the property of the estate
that these heirs might htave claim'ed was "subject to
administration," and, so, was subject to be changed
therein, by partition and distribution ·provisions of the
statutes under the agreement between the heirs themselves as to their respective portions, and by the "settle-
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ments, partitions and distributions" agreed to by the
appellants, and ordered by the Court.

It seems, also, to have been fully demonstrated that
this final decree, was just that, and that it can be set
aside, if at all, only by proper process and in an equity
suit with jurisdiction acquired over the subject 1natter
and all necessary parties; and then only upon allegations
and proof of extrinsic fraud.
We respectfully submit that respondent's motion
was well taken and properly sustained and that the
order thereon dismissing appellants' petition should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE &
MULLINER
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Savings & Trust Company
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